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Abstract
Experimental and field evidence show that people perceive and evaluate
new risks differently from risks that are common. In particular, people get
used to the presence of certain risks and become less eager to avoid them.
We explain this observation by including risks in the reference states of in-
dividuals, which requires a more general concept of the reference state than
has previously been considered in the literature.
We find two effects. First, the inclusion of the risk in the reference state
changes its evaluation. A risk being present on the market induces a self-
enforcing process of increasing acceptance of this risk without any new infor-
mation becoming available or people’s tastes changing. We term this the risk
inclusion effect. Second, a risk with lower inherent (reference-independent)
utility may be preferred to a risk with higher inherent utility if individuals are
more used to accepting the former than the latter. This leads to inefficient
decisions if habituation is seen as contributing less to welfare than inherent
utility. Both effects have implications for the optimal regulation of risks.
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1 Introduction
Experimental and field evidence show that people perceive and evaluate new risks
differently from risks that are common. In particular, people get used to the
presence of certain risks and become less eager to avoid them. We explain this
observation by including risks in the reference states of individuals, which requires
a more general concept of the reference state than has previously been considered
in the literature.
We find two effects. First, the inclusion of the risk in the reference state changes its
evaluation. A risk being present on the market induces a self-enforcing process of
increasing acceptance of this risk without any new information becoming available
or people’s tastes changing. We term this the risk inclusion effect. Second, a risk
with lower inherent (reference-independent) utility may be preferred to a risk with
higher inherent utility if individuals are more used to accepting the former than the
latter. This leads to inefficient decisions if habituation is seen as contributing less
to welfare than inherent utility. It also offers a new explanation for the reduction
of the disparity in willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA)
measures of value in repeated market-like settings.
Both effects have implications for the optimal regulation of risks. In particular,
the risk inclusion effect induces a need to regulate the entry of new risks into the
market with great care, since initially low acceptance levels may increase quickly,
leading to increased risk production. Anecdotal evidence from the regulation of
genetically modified Bt-corn in the US supports this view (see Bratspies, 2002).
It shows that with lax regulatory requirements at the introduction of a risk, a
subsequent tightening of the rules may be hard to implement.
That people’s preferences are reference-dependent has been confirmed in many
experiments. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that individuals
evaluate prospects as losses and gains relative to a reference point rather than as
absolute outcomes. As an implication of reference dependence, numerous experi-
ments found an endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), according to which the value of
an object increases once one possesses this object.
With reference-dependent preferences, the evaluation of prospects depends cru-
cially on the definition of the reference state. Most models assume the reference
state to be the status quo, that is, the person’s current asset position or endow-
ment (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler, 1990, 1991;
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). An alternative approach emphasizes the role
of expectations as reference point. Shalev (2000) takes the expected return on
a portfolio as reference state for the evaluation of financial prospects. Köszegi
and Rabin (2004) propose a person’s recent belief or expectation about a future
outcome as the reference point for this outcome. A third concept is presented
by Sugden (2003), who includes acts that yield uncertain outcomes as possible
reference states.
All these views have their merits, and it is hard to generally favor one over the
other. However, one can easily reconcile them into a broader concept. Indeed, a
conflict between the different concepts arises only if one interprets the status quo
narrowly, namely as the physical endowments currently in one’s possession (as is
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done in the status quo models). Instead, we suggest the interpretation of the status
quo as the individual’s current life situation. Then, it consists of much more than
(state-dependent) physical endowments or expectations over future endowments.
It includes all kinds of beliefs, perceptions, tastes, (sensory) feelings etc. Which of
these components becomes relevant depends on the task, decision or situation that
the individual evaluates. Regarding financial prospects, a person’s current rate of
return expectation may describe her status quo sufficiently well (as in Shalev,
2000), but other components of risk perception like familiarity, voluntariness etc.
may also be relevant. If she is to evaluate the temperature in a room, her current
feeling may constitute her status quo, but habituation to low or high temperatures
may matter just as much. When evaluating health risks, the individual’s current
health state may have to be augmented with her risk perception to constitute her
reference state, etc. Under such a broad concept, any feature of a person’s current
situation is part of her status quo and hence determines her reference state.
This concept is a generalization of the narrow status quo concepts used in the
literature and incorporates those as special cases. However, it could be blamed
to be too general to be applied. Indeed, for each evaluation it requires a decision
about which of the components of the status quo is relevant. So are we back
at square one? Not really. Our general concept makes clear that the various
approaches that are discussed in the literature are merely applications of the same
idea to different situations, and that the one ”right” narrow definition of the
reference state will likely not exist. In addition, it serves the important purpose of
drawing attention to decisions where neither the physical-endowments approach
nor the expected-outcome approach yield satisfying results, such that alternative
concepts need to be developed.1
In this paper, we develop such a new concept for the evaluation of assets that
cause non-monetary long-term risks, for instance, health risks. In particular, we
explicitly include these risks in the reference state. There are three reasons why
the concepts of the reference state that are proposed in the literature cannot be
applied here. The first is that for the evaluation of such risks the source of the risk
matters, and not only its outcomes. Second, the risk itself can become part of the
reference state, rather than only its expected outcomes. And third, the inclusion
of a risk in the reference state is a gradual process and cannot be described by a
zero-one state variable as for physical endowments or expected purchase decisions.
Consider the first reason, namely that the source of a risk matters for its evalua-
tion, rather than simply its outcome. Think, for example, of the risk from dying
in a car accident vs. the risk from dying from a bomb attack. Both can lead to a
sudden, violent death and can only partly be controlled (e.g., by driving carefully
or rarely, and by avoiding crowded places). Hence, in terms of the outcomes they
cause, the two risks can be interpreted as being roughly comparable. However,
few people will consider them as similar. This is due to the fact that when peo-
ple evaluate risks, they do not simply aggregate probabilities of (fatal) outcomes.
Instead, the nature of the source of the risk matters for its evaluation (see Slovic
(2001) for a comprehensive treatment of the factors that determine the percep-
1It should be clear from the discussion so far that these new concepts would not aim at
replacing the existing approaches but at specifying the general approach for a class of prospects
where these approaches cannot be applied.
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tion of risks). Accordingly, when people assess risks, they tend to frame them
narrowly, i.e., they evaluate each risk (source) in isolation rather than aggregating
the outcomes of all risks in their portfolio.2
The second reason why a new concept is required is that risks themselves can
become part of the reference state. This is motivated by the observation that
among all the risks that individuals face, some are seemingly carried happily, while
others, that appear to be comparable in their objective severity, are accepted with
great reluctance. Examples for the first kind are the risks arising from commuting
to work every day, eating one’s usual diet or taking aspirin. For the second kind one
could think of the risk from terrorist attacks or the risk from eating genetically
modified (gm) food for European consumers. We claim that the difference in
the evaluation of these risks arises (at least partly) from the first kind being
included in individuals’ reference states (known risks), and the second kind being
excluded (new risks). Health risks are special in that for many such risks, outcomes
are expected to become apparent only several years after the risk was accepted.
During this time, i.e., as long as one does not have an accident, does not develop a
food-related illness etc., outcomes cannot become included in the reference state.
Hence, if habituation takes place, individuals get used to the mere presence of a
risk, rather than to its outcomes.
Experimental evidence supports this claim. In experiments by Thaler (1980) and
Viscusi, Magat and Huber (1987) an endowment effect was found for the accep-
tance of risks. In Thaler’s experiment, subjects were first asked how much they
would be willing to pay in order to cure a disease they had been exposed to, which
had a 0.001 risk of death. Then, they were asked how much they would have to
be paid in order to be exposed to this disease willingly, i.e., accept an additional
risk of death of 0.001. Thaler finds that most people were willing to pay much less
in the first case then they demanded in the second. This means that once a risk
is accepted, individuals’ willingness to pay for eliminating it is reduced compared
to the willingness to accept payment for taking the risk before one first did so.
Hence, the endowment effect, which arises from a change in the reference point is
present also for risks.
Viscusi, Magat, Huber (1987) obtained a similar result in an experiment where
shoppers were asked about their willingness to pay for the reduction of the existing
risk from standard insecticides vs. the price they would demand in order to accept
an increase in this risk.3 In the latter case, 77% of the subjects bluntly refused
to buy the product with the increased risk at any positive price. Those that
did accept the riskier product demanded a premium 6 to 10 times higher than
that for risk reductions. An interesting detail here is that the subjects were not
actually endowed with either of the insecticides. The only difference between the
two products was that in the first case, subjects would have to pay for a reduction
of the risk from standard insecticides, while in the second case they where asked to
2Taken literally, it is more to the point to say that the vectors of relevant risk characteristics
are so complex, i.e., they include so many different dimensions to describe a risk, that two risks
are never comparable in all dimensions. Accordingly, if utility is non-separable in risk dimensions,
risks have to be evaluated in isolation.
3The two designs differ in that Thaler considers a new risk, while Viscusi, Magat, Huber
consider an increase in a known risk. However, this increase seems to lead to a qualitative
difference in the perception of the risk, such that the two cases are indeed comparable.
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accept a risk level above the normal standard (which represents the qualitatively
new risk). Hence, (expected) physical possession did not matter, while a risk
being standard or common did matter.4
These experiments show that subjects have a tendency to pay less to avoid an
existing risk than they demand to accept a new risk. The interpretation of the
endowment effect indicates that this is due to some risks being included in the
reference state and others being excluded. An important question then is how
the process of risk inclusion works. This leads to the third reason for developing
a new model. In the two experiments described above (and in most literature
on the endowment effect and reference-dependent preferences in general), only the
two extreme cases are considered: complete reference state inclusion and complete
exclusion. This binary perception of the reference state stems from its presentation
as either a narrow physical-endowment status quo (to have or not to have) or the
expectation over a future endowment (e.g., to buy or not to buy).5 If, instead,
one interprets the reference state to include concepts like habituation, it cannot
be expected to change ad hoc, i.e., to be describable by a binary {0, 1} variable.6
Rather, reference state changes must be expected to happen gradually over time.
The notion of a gradual reference state change is not new to the economic liter-
ature; it was already widely applied in models of habit formation (Duesenberry,
1949; Pollak, 1970; Ryder and Heal, 1973).7 With habit formation, a person’s
consumption level today and/or the consumption level of others influences her
future habit level, which constitutes the reference state and affects her preferences
(see, e.g., Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Wathieu, 1999). There are, however,
substantial differences between our model and models of habit formation. The
latter refer to realized monetary outcomes, i.e., to a narrow status quo definition,
which does not include risks. In addition, most of the models apply habit for-
mation to financial decision making (Campbell and Cochrane, 1997; Gomes and
Michaelides, 2003; Polkovnichenko, 2003), and consider aggregated consumption
instead of disintegrating it into particular assets. With such an approach, the
sources of the risk cannot be taken into consideration. Hence, individual risks
cannot be included in the reference state. Yet, the ideas underlying habit forma-
tion and risk inclusion are related: persistence of a state of nature leads people to
get used to this state, which gradually changes their evaluation of this state and
other states related to it. Hence, when specifying the risk inclusion process we are
able to draw on some results of this literature.
Assuming a gradual risk inclusion process, its endpoint is naturally hard to de-
termine. Consider again the experiment by Viscusi, Magat and Huber (1987).
4The experiments also show that the endowment effect can be observed for non-monetary
risks, a view that is supported by the work of Breyer and Fuchs (1982). The authors conducted
a questionnaire survey in US hospitals and found the main implications of reference-dependent
preferences confirmed in the context of health risks.
5Shalev’s (2000) expected return is somewhat of an exception. However, his concept is
markedly different from ours in that a change in the reference state in his model requires new in-
formation on the investment (its outcomes or outcome distribution) or a change in the individual’s
utility function.
6Köszegi and Rabin (2004) do not specify the process of expectation building, leaving room
for gradual adjustment. However, the presentation of expectations in their model does not imply
a gradual approach.
7See also the literature on social comparison, e.g., Festinger (1954) and Wood (1989).
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How can one know whether the standard insecticide is 80% or 100% included in
the reference state of individuals? In practice, one cannot. This means that one
cannot know whether the authors found a full or just a partial endowment effect.
What one can infer relatively safely is that they found an endowment effect,
and hence there has to be a process at work that makes a formerly new risk an
endowed risk. This is what matters for our argument. In the model, we will
assume the risk inclusion process to begin when the first individual accepts the
risk and to end when all individuals accept it, a state that will hardly obtain in
practice. Nevertheless, an endowment effect will be observable whenever there
is a difference in people’s habituation to two otherwise similar risks. Regarding
the experiment by Viscusi, Magat and Huber, we would expect the difference in
WTP/WTA to decrease if the new insecticide with the increased risk was available
on the market for some time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop our
concept of the reference state, from which we derive the risk inclusion effect in
section 3. The individual’s utility function is specified and an explanation of the
WTA/WTP difference given in section 4. Section 5 applies the results to the
individual’s risk acceptance decision. In section 6 we analyze the implications for
risk regulation. Field evidence is presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes and
gives a brief outlook on future research.
2 Reference state determination
We focus on non-monetary long-term risks that do not cause adverse effects im-
mediately but only some time after they were accepted. An obvious application
are health risks caused by food, life style, driving behavior etc. For concreteness,
we will refer to these risks throughout the paper, but the application of the model
is not limited to them. We shall call the source of the risk an ’asset’, which is
meant to include goods, actions etc.
The risky asset x induces a set of possible outcome vectors, x = {x1, ..., xi, ..., xI}.
Each xi should be thought of as a vector of health dimensions. The set of possible
outcome vectors is discrete and bounded with xi ∈ [x1, 0]. This means that in the
best case the risk does not cause an effect in any dimension (unchanged health
state), while in the worst case it causes outcome x1. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that outcomes can be ordered according to their severity: x1 ≺ .. ≺
xi ≺ xi+1 ≺ .. ¹ 0. Individuals have a common prior distribution over the set of
possible outcomes, denoted p(x).
There is a population of individuals, which is characterized by its members being
able to observe each others’ risk decisions (e.g., through the media, personal rela-
tions etc.). Let t = 0 be the time when the risky asset is first chosen by a member
of the population. We assume that the risk enters people’s reference states only
if at least one member of the population accepts it. This means that up to t = 0,
the risk is not included in any individual’s reference state: ĝt = 0 for t ≤ 0, where
ĝ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of reference state inclusion of the risk.
The process of risk inclusion depends, first, on the individual’s own past decisions,
denoted by the binary variable ht ∈ {0, 1}, where ht = 1 if the risk was accepted
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and ht = 0 otherwise. Second, it depends on the aggregated decisions of the other
members of the population, where Ht ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of people that
accept the risk in t. The degree of reference state inclusion in period t is then
given as
ĝt = φĝt−1 + (1− φ)(αht−1 + (1− α)Ht−1) α, φ ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
φ and α are individual parameters. φ determines the speed of reference state
inclusion. α determines the relevance of an individual’s own decision vs. the
aggregated decisions of others for her degree of risk inclusion. Note that for φ = 0
and α = 1, we recover the common endowment effect where the reference state is
equal to one’s narrow status quo or endowment last period.
This specification of the degree of reference state inclusion is related to the habit
level in models of habit formation. The inclusion of one’s own decisions reflects
internal habit formation as, for example, in Sundaresan (1989) and Constantinides
(1990). This concept is recovered from (1) for φ > 0 and α = 1. The relevance
of other people’s decisions reflects social comparison preferences or external habit
formation (see, e.g., Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1997), which is obtained
from (1) for φ > 0 and α = 0. Hence, through the calibration of φ and α, (1) can
account for the most widely used concepts of the reference state. We will show
that our results hold as long as φ < 1 and α < 1, i.e., as long as the aggregated
decisions of other members of the population have an impact on the reference
state of the individual.
As a minimum rationality condition, we assume that subjects make consistent
decisions in the sense that they follow the same decision concept each period.
This means that changes in decisions arise only from changes in the parameters
of the decision program. Hence, once an individual decided to accept a risk, she
will continue to accept this risk until some parameter change induces her to avoid
it. As we will show below, risk acceptance is monotone increasing in the degree of
reference state inclusion, meaning that once an individual accepts a risk, without
changes in the exogenous parameters she will accept the risk in all future periods:
ht = 1 ⇒ hs = 1 ∀s ≥ t. When determining the process of risk acceptance, i.e.,
the share of individuals accepting the risk, this monotonicity allows us to consider
at time t only those individuals for whom ht−1 = 0. Hence, the degree of reference
state inclusion can be reduced to
gt = φgt−1 + (1− φ)(1− α)Ht−1 α, φ ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
The reference state r of the risk is a vector that consists of the same health
dimensions as the outcomes xi. In contrast, gt is simply a number between zero
and one. Consider first the two extreme cases. Complete risk exclusion means that
the degree of reference state inclusion is zero: gt = 0. Accordingly, the reference
state regarding the risk under consideration is ”no health effect”: r = 0. With
complete risk inclusion, gt = 1. Then, the risk itself serves as reference: r = x.
Partial risk inclusion, gt ∈ (0, 1), means that the risk is included in the reference
state to less than full extent. We do not claim to know what ”inclusion to less
than full extent” means psychologically. The only assumption necessary for our
argument is that for x 6= 0 and g < g′: gx|r Â g′x|r ∀r with gtx = {gtx1, .., gtxI}.
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This means that less of the risk (less severe outcomes) is preferred to more of the
risk for all reference states.8 However, in order to make our argument clear and
keep the model as simple as possible, we specify a process of reference state change
that is linear in the degree of risk inclusion gt in each period t:
rt = (1− gt)0 + gtx = gtx (3)
where x = {x1, .., xI} as before. Remember that rt does not denote the complete
reference state of the individual but only the part that focuses on the particular
risk under consideration.9
3 Risk inclusion effect
We assume that the preferences of all individuals under consideration satisfy
the axioms necessary for a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation of
reference-dependent preferences to exist. Sugden (2003) provides such an ax-
iomatization where he extends the original Savage (1954) axioms to account for
reference dependence. In particular, the SEU representation exists if there is a
unique probability measure p, and a relative value function v, such that for all
Savage-acts j, k, l: j º k|l ⇐⇒ Ep[v(j|l) − v(k|l)] ≥ 0 (Sugden, 2003, p. 175),
i.e., if an act j is weakly preferred to an act k when both are viewed from l, if
and only if the expected difference in relative values of j under l and k under l is
non-negative.
The relative value function is defined as a finitely valued function v : X×X → R,
where X is the set of consequences or outcomes, and
A1: v(x|x) = 0 for all x.
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we add two additional assumptions:
A2: v(x|r) is continuous for all x and twice differentiable for x 6= r;
A3: v′(x|r) > 0 for all x given r.
v(x|r) is to be interpreted as a measure of the value of x, relative to r, when both
are viewed from the reference point r.
A1 shows that v represents only relative values, i.e., values of changes from a cer-
tain reference state. A2 is a technical assumption (which allows for loss aversion,
i.e., a ”kink” at x = r). A3 means that v is increasing in x over the range of rel-
evant values. This is not a straightforward assumption since, in contrast to most
other models of reference-dependent preferences, we do not consider monetary
outcomes here. We do, however, assume outcomes to be ordered with increasing
preferability. v(x|r) can thus be interpreted as to be increasing in the index of xi.
From the above specifications, the effect of risk inclusion on the relative value of
the risk follows immediately:
8Throughout the paper, x|y will be taken to mean ”x viewed from y”.
9Over the life time of the risk, two components of the reference state are relevant. The first
is the one that we consider in this paper, namely the reference state regarding the risk that the
individual accepts. The second component is the reference state regarding the individual’s actual
health state. It becomes relevant only if the adverse health effects actually occur. Then, the
reference state must be expected to be the health state immediately before the occurrence of
these effects, such that they will always be perceived as losses. This second component is not
considered in this paper.
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Proposition 1 If v(x|r) is a relative value function that satisfies A1− A3, then
the following holds:
For all x 6= 0 and g, g′ such that g < g′,
v(x|gx) < v(x|g′x). (4)
The proof is obvious. For g < g′ and x 6= 0 ⇒ gx Â g′x: less risk is preferred to
more. Proposition 1 then follows directly for increasing relative value functions: a
given risk or vector of possible outcomes under a lower reference point is preferred
to the same risk under a higher reference point. Similarly, it can be shown that for
all xi 6= 0 and g, g′ such that g < g′, v(xi|gxi) < v(xi|g′xi). The proposition holds
independently of how the health dimensions of xi are aggregated into v(x|gx),
as long as an increase in value in one dimension does not lead to a decrease in
overall value. In particular, it does not require additive separability of the value
function across dimensions. To summarize, Proposition 1 shows that the value
that an individual assigns to a given risk increases with an increasing degree of
risk inclusion, without any new information becoming available.
Assuming that probabilities are linear10 we obtain the value of the risky asset as




Since v(xi|gxi) is increasing in g, and as p(x) is independent of g, V (x, g) is
increasing in g. Hence, we have established that for any increasing relative value
function the value that an individual assigns to a risky asset is increasing in the




This section considers the implications of the risk inclusion effect for the total
utility of the individual. The utility from accepting the risky asset has two com-
ponents. First, it yields present utility up(x) immediately after consumption (e.g.,
not feeling hungry anymore after eating). Second, it gives rise to future utility
uf (x) by affecting the individual’s health some time after consumption. Future
utility uf (x) again has two parts: the inherent utility from the health risk, u(x),
which is reference-independent, and the relative value v(x|r) which depends on
the reference state.11 We obtain the overall utility from consuming asset x as
U(x, r) = up(x) + uf (x)
= up(x) + u(x) + v(x|r) (6)
10For theory and evidence on non-linear probability weights, see e.g., Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), Wu and Gonzalez (1999) and Starmer (2000). The effect of risk inclusion with probability
weights will be considered in a companion paper.
11u(x) and v(x|r) in our model are related to the ”attitudes to end states” and ”attitudes
to gain and loss” in Sugden (2003) or the ”consumption” and ”loss-gain” utility in Köszegi and
Rabin (2004). The difference is, however, that we do not consider realized outcomes but accepted
risks.
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where r is defined according to (3) and we abstract from discounting.
Consider two risky assets x and z that induce reference-independent utilities
Ū(x) = up(x) + u(x) and Ū(z) = up(z) + u(z) and relative values v(x|gxx) and
v(z|gzz). Specify an increase ε in the utility of one asset and two degrees of
reference state inclusion gx and gz. Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 For two risky assets x and z such that Ū(x) = Ū(z), and v(x|gxx) =
v(z|gzz) for gx = gz:
If gx > gz ⇒ ∃ε > 0 such that Ū(x) + ε = Ū(z) and U(x, r) > U(z, r), i.e., x Â z.
The proof follows directly from (6) and Proposition 1. Proposition 2 shows that
for two risky assets between which an individual with either reference-independent
or reference-dependent preferences is originally indifferent, one can always add a
positive amount ε to the reference-independent utility of one asset such that this
amount can be offset by a higher degree of reference state inclusion. An individual
with reference-dependent preferences will then prefer the asset with the lower
reference-independent utility to the asset with the higher reference-independent
utility.
The result of Proposition 2 implies inefficient decisions of individuals if v(x|r) is
not perceived as contributing towards welfare to the same extent as does reference-
independent utility. Different levels of habituation to risks can then lead to
welfare-decreasing consumer decisions. See section 6 for a more comprehensive
interpretation of this result.
From v(x|x) = 0 and v(x|r) ≤ 0 for x ≤ r (see A1 and A3), and (4) we obtain
that limg→1v(x|gx) = 0. Hence,
limg→1U(x, r) = up(x) + u(x). (7)
This expression shows that with increasing inclusion of the risk in the reference
state the utility from the risky asset converges towards its inherent utility. In
other words, when the risk gets fully included in the reference state, an individ-
ual with reference-dependent preferences and an individual with a classical von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function derive the same utility from accepting the
risk (provided that they have identical inherent utility functions up(·) and u(·)).
However, this does not mean that the reference-dependent preferences of the in-
dividual become increasingly reference-independent. Rather, what was perceived
as a loss from the original reference point (and caused reference dependence to
become effective) is not considered a loss anymore.
The effect from (7) offers a new explanation for the observation that the difference
between WTP and WTA diminishes when preferences are elicited repeatedly in a
market-like setting, which we discuss in the next section.
4.2 WTA/WTP disparity and risk inclusion
In this section, we will argue that the observed decrease in the WTA/WTP dis-
parity can by explained with the risk inclusion effect. Since Knetsch and Sinden
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(1984) published the results of a series of experiments showing significant dif-
ferences between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept measures of value,
other experiments have been conducted to show that this anomaly is greatly re-
duced in repeated market-like settings (Coursey, Hovis and Schulze, 1987; Shogren
et al., 2001; Loomes, Starmer and Sugden, 2003). Without giving a full overview
over the literature, we will reconsider some of the experiments and their interpre-
tation in light of our model.
Coursey et al. (1987) ran repeated Vickrey-like auctions of the obligation to taste
a bitter substance (sucrose octa-acetate or SOA), while Loomes et al. (2003) ran
similar auctions of vouchers and lotteries. The results of both experiments show
a significant disparity between WTA and WTP measures of value in the initial
rounds, but a reduction of this disparity in later rounds. From their results,
Coursey et al. infer that any difference in elicited values is merely due to mistakes
made by the subjects, rather than to differences in the ”true” preferences. Through
repeated auctions, individuals learn both their true preferences and that revealing
their true value is their dominant strategy. Similarly, Loomes et al. conclude
that ”market experience does tend to erode whatever causal factors generate the
tendency for WTA to be systematically greater than WTP” and that ”the factor
being eroded is something other than, or additional to, strategic bias.” (p. C165).
The authors offer the explanation that loss averse individuals ”by participating in
markets in which endowments are routinely sold, [..] become more familiar with,
and so less averse to, the idea of selling” (p. C166).12
This latter point, which the authors do not elaborate on, hints towards the ar-
gument of our model. Consider the situation subjects are faced with in the two
experiments. The results of the first auction rounds may be different from the
subject’s initial status quo. If this is the case, the reference state will adjust (fully
or partially) towards this new state in later rounds. Under a new reference state,
the relative value of prospects changes, leading to different WTA/WTP measures
in the final rounds. The convergence of WTP and WTA would then be observed
also for subjects whose preferences are reference-dependent. The ”correction of
mistakes” or ”erosion of causal factors” would not be necessary to explain the
observed behavior.13
Note that the described experiments correspond with our model in another im-
portant feature, namely that subjects do not obtain feedback on the outcomes
12An alternative experiment is reported by List (2003). He analyzes the trading behavior of
traders vs. visitors at a US sports card fare. He finds fairly large WTA/WTP differences for
relatively inexperienced consumers, but these differences disappear for experienced consumers and
traders. However, the line of causality is not clear in his experiment. Rather than concluding like
List that by trading more frequently, people’s behavior converges towards reference independence,
one could also claim that people whose preferences are relatively reference-independent (or who
are inclined to trading or gambling), tend to trade more frequently and will have come to the
fare in a ”gambling mood” (as either traders or consumers).
13The same argument applies to the experiment of Shogren et al. (2001), who tested for the
effect of substitutability on the WTA/WTP measures in repeated auction settings.
Our model can also explain the difference in WTA and WTP trends that Coursey et al. found,
namely that the WTA measures decreased, but the WTP measures did not increase. For WTA,
reference state adoption means changing the notion of ”tasting SOA” from a ”loss” into ”not-so-
clearly a loss”. For WTP, on the other hand, ”not tasting SOA” is changed from a ”gain” into
”not-so-clearly a gain”. If subjects are loss averse, preferences are more strongly affected in the
first case than in the second.
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of their decisions. In both experiments, the subjects did not know when bidding
whether the current round would be decisive for their final payoffs. For instance,
the losers of an auction did not necessarily have to taste SOA. Hence, if a subject
in one round found herself in a state different from her (prior) status quo, the sole
possibility that this round may turn out to be decisive would have led to a change
in her reference state. The observed convergence of WTP and WTA measures
would then be fully in line with the predictions of our model.14
5 Risk acceptance decision
5.1 Individual risk acceptance decision
We analyze the individual’s risk acceptance decision in a simple two-period model
(see figure 1). Consider first the monetary flows. In period 1, she earns income
Y1, which she can invest into consumption c1 or in a safe investment B. In period
2, she earns income Y2, receives B(1 + i) and consumes all wealth, c2. If the
individual performs mental accounting (see, e.g., Thaler, 1999), i.e., she aggregates
expenditures with the same intended purpose, Y and B are to be interpreted
as those parts of income and investment that are assigned to the same mental
account as x and the substitute safe good (e.g., food). For simplicity, we assume
the interest rate i to be the same for saving (B > 0) and borrowing (B < 0). i is
the real interest rate between periods 1 and 2, i.e., it is unknown in period 1. Y2
and i impose a monetary risk on the individual, that is, on her consumption level
in period 2.
The individual chooses between the risky asset x and a safe but more expensive
comparable asset y. Present utility is equal for both assets and normalized to zero:
up(x) = up(y) = 0. Since y is a safe asset which does not cause adverse health
effects its future utility is uf (y) = 0. This yields utilities for the two assets of
U(x, r) = u(x) + v(x|r) for the risky asset
U(y, r) = 0 for the safe asset.
The risky asset sells at price Px and the safe asset at price Py, where Py = Px +π.
For ease of notation, we set Px = 0, and hence Py = π. The decision whether to
purchase the risky asset (accept the risk and pay the lower price) or the safe asset
(avoid the risk and pay the higher price π) is made in period 1. Hence, period 1
is identical with the time t when the degree of risk inclusion is evaluated.15 The
health effects of the risk occur in period 2. Note that the time between periods 1
and 2 is far longer than between t and t + 1. The parameter ξ indicates whether
an individual accepts the risk (ξ = 0) or not (ξ = 1).
14Formally, the definitions of h and H have to be changed slightly. Since ”true” risk acceptance
is unknown when bidding, h is not a simple binary variable anymore. Instead, expected values
are taken for both h and H such that E(h) ∈ [0, 1] and E(H) ∈ [0, 1]. Risk inclusion is then
determined by ĝ∗t = φĝ
∗
t−1 + (1− φ)(αE(ht−1) + (1− α)E(Ht−1)), see (1). Despite the different
formal representation, the argument is identical with the one for gt, such that we will not consider
ĝ∗t in detail.









Y2, B(1 + i), c2
t
Figure 1: Timing
Similarly to the health risk, the evaluation of the monetary risk depends on the
individual’s reference consumption rc. Hence, the utility from consumption of
monetary goods also has a reference-independent and a reference-dependent com-
ponent. However, for monetary risks both components arise immediately after
consumption: Uc(c, rc) = uc(c) + vc(c|rc).16 We assume that the reference point
for future consumption is formed from expectations over future consumption pos-
sibilities (see Shalev, 2000, and Köszegi and Rabin, 2004). This means that the
reference point in period 2, rc2 , is determined by the individual’s expectations over
c2, i.e., over Y2 and i. Hence, in period 1 E(c2) is neither viewed as a gain nor as
a loss: E(vc(c2|rc2)) = 0.17 This implicitly assumes that individuals do not antic-
ipate any endowment or habit formation effects on consumption between periods
1 and 2. We make this assumption for the following reason. The time between
the risk acceptance decision and the expected health effects from the risk may be
substantial, such that several consumption periods may lay in between the ”risk
relevant” periods 1 and 2. Hence, calculating habit effects would require detailed
knowledge of the future consumption path. E(Uc(c2, rc2)) would only be affected
by habit formation if individuals had an expectation over this path and over the
effects that it will have on their reference points in period 2. We will assume that
individuals are not able or willing to form such sophisticated expectations (see
also Munro and Sugden, 2003).
The individual’s optimal risk acceptance decision is then obtained from the pro-
gram
maxB,ξ Uc(c1, rc1) + β{E[Uc(c2, rc2) + (1− ξ)U(x, r)]} (8)
s.t. c1 = Y1 −B − ξπ ≥ 0
c2 = Y2 + B(1 + i)
U(x, r) = u(x) + v(x|gx)
Uc(c, rc) = uc(c) + vc(c|rc)
β is the discount factor between periods 1 and 2. In analogy to representations
16That there is no lagged utility from overall consumption is a simplifying assumption, which
implies that neither c1 nor c2 are expected to induce any long-term health risks. Portfolio effects
from accepting several risks with possible long-term effects are considered in a companion paper.
17The expectation operator throughout the paper denotes expectations in period 1. The index
is therefore suppressed.
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of reference-independent preferences, in (8) we assume utility to be separable in
monetary and health goods.
For simplicity, we solve the optimization program separately for ξ = 0 and ξ = 1,
i.e., we do not consider intermediate values 0 < ξ < 1. This means that we assume
the risk decision to be binary: the risk is either fully accepted (”eat gm-tomatoes”)
or completely avoided (”do not eat gm-tomatoes”), but not partly accepted and
avoided (”eat gm-tomatoes during the week but not on weekends”). This seems
a reasonable assumption when interpreting the risky asset as a consumption good
or policy measure (support or do not support). From this we obtain the optimal
saving decisions and the maximum utility that the individual can receive in both
cases.




i u(xi)p(xi)+V (x, gt), the overall
utility from (8) can be written as




u(xi)p(xi) + V (x, gt))
The individual’s utility for ξ = 0 and ξ = 1 is given by




u(xi)p(xi) + V (x, gt)) (9)
U(B, ξ = 1) = Uc(Y1 −B − π, rc1) + βEt[Uc(Y2 + B(1 + i), rc2,ξ=1)] (10)
The optimal investments into the bond are determined by the first order conditions
U ′c(Y1 −Bξ=0, rc1) = βE[(1 + i)u′c(Y2 + Bξ=0(1 + i))] (11)
U ′c(Y1 −Bξ=1 − π, rc1) = βE[(1 + i)u′c(Y2 + Bξ=1(1 + i))] , (12)
where we use the fact that E(vc(c2|rc2)) = 0, i.e., E[U ′c(Y2 + Bξ(1 + i), rc2)] =
E(u′c(Y2 + Bξ(1 + i))). Due to the separability of the utility function, the optimal
amount B∗ξ=0 when the risk is accepted is independent of the expected effect from
the risk. The optimal amount B∗ξ=1 when the risk is avoided depends on the price
π of risk avoidance.
To derive the optimal investments B∗, the first order conditions (11) and (12)
need to be considered for two different cases: i) c1 is evaluated as a gain, i.e., it is
higher than expected; ii) c1 is evaluated as a loss, i.e., it is lower than expected.
For risk averse or risk neutral individuals, standard utility uc(c) is increasing in
c and weakly concave over its entire range.18 vc(c|rc) has also been found to be
concave in the range of gains. In the range of losses, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) found vc(c|rc) to be convex, while the habit formation literature assumes
it to be concave. Hence, we have that Uc(c, rc) is concave for gains, but may be
concave or convex for losses. The curvature of Uc for losses if vc is convex depends
on the relative curvature of uc and vc at consumption levels c and rc.
E(Uc(c2, rc2)) = E(uc(c2)), i.e., it is concave for all consumption levels c2. Uc(c1, rc1)
is determined jointly by uc and vc. uc is concave everywhere and steeper for smaller
18We do not consider risk loving individuals.
14
values (”losses” in the sense of vc.). If vc is also concave for losses, Uc(c1, rc1) is
concave for c1 over its entire range. Let us first consider this case. Fix a B∗ξ=0
such that (11) is satisfied. For Bξ=1 = B∗ξ=0 the left hand side of (12) exceeds the
right hand side. In order to satisfy (12), Bξ=1 has to decrease, such that the left





but B∗ξ=1 + π > B
∗
ξ=0 . (14)
If an individual accepts the risk, she saves more or borrows less than if she avoids
it, but the difference is less than the price premium π.
Consider now the case when vc is convex for losses, i.e., we are in the context of
loss aversion with diminishing sensitivity. For loss averse individuals, vc has been
found to be steeper for losses than for gains. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have
estimated that vc(x < r|r) is steeper than vc(x > r|r) by a factor 2 to 2.5. Since
uc is also steeper for smaller x, the aggregated function Uc(c1, rc1) is steeper for
losses by a factor exceeding 2.5. Hence, since E[uc(c2)] is reference-independent,
for most realizations of Y2 and i optimization will lead to the choice of B∗ such
that c1 is considered as a gain. This is because due to the steepness of the utility
function for losses, for Uc(c1 < rc1 , rc1) and rc1 − c1 not too large, utility Uc is
increasing much faster for increasing c1 than it is decreasing for diminishing c2. B∗
would then be chosen small enough such that c1 > rc1 . In this case, Uc(c1, rc1) is
again concave in the relevant range and the above argumentation applies, leading
to the results (13) and (14).
By the same argument, if c1 is considered a loss before paying π, after the payment
of π the adjustment of B∗ will in most cases move c1 ”back” towards smaller losses,
again leading to results (13) and (14). Only for extreme distributions of c1 and c2
and strongly convex relative value functions (rapidly diminishing sensitivity) will
individuals find it optimal to accumulate huge losses in period 1. Such extreme
constellations were required in order for the payment of π to induce a move towards
larger losses, i.e., B∗ξ=1 > B
∗
ξ=0. In what follows we will abstract from these
extreme cases and assume (13) and (14) to hold.
Applying B∗ξ=0 and B
∗
ξ=1 to (9) and (10), we obtain the following condition for




u(xi)p(xi) + V (x, gt)] < Uc(Y1 −B∗ξ=1 − π, rc1)− Uc(Y1 −B∗ξ=0, rc1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=a
+
+βE[uc(Y2 + B∗ξ=1(1 + i))− uc(Y2 + B∗ξ=0(1 + i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=b
] (15)
Intuitively, the term a measures the individual’s decrease in utility from lower
consumption in period 1 due to the monetary loss π, which is partly offset by the
difference in investments, B∗ξ=0 − B∗ξ=1. Term b measures the decrease in utility
from lower consumption in period 2 due to having saved less or borrowed more
in period 1. From (14) and (13) we obtain that a < 0 and b < 0, respectively.
Hence, if the discounted value of the risk exceeds in absolute terms the decrease in
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(discounted) expected value from monetary consumption in periods 1 and 2, it is
optimal for the individual to avoid the risk. (15) implicitly determines a degree of
risk inclusion g∗ for each individual such that for gt = g∗ she is indifferent between
accepting and avoiding the risk.
If the expected value of the risk, V (x|gtx), increases due to an increase in gt, the
condition for the avoidance of the risk is tightened, i.e., people’s willingness to
pay for risk avoidance is reduced. This results in a (weakly) monotone increase
in the share of risk acceptance, which justifies the monotonicity assumption we
made in section 2. If more people accept the risk, the reference state increases for
all individuals with φ 6= 1 and α 6= 1,19 leading to a further increase in V (x|gtx).
Hence, the process of increasing aggregated risk acceptance is self-enforcing, that
is, it does not require that the population obtains any new information regarding
the risk. Consequently, as implied by Proposition 2, acceptance of two objectively
identical risks may differ widely depending on how long the risk inclusion process
is already at work. We discuss the implications of this result in section 6.
Remark 1 In the optimization program (8) it is assumed that the individual does
not consider the price π of avoiding the risk in isolation but within its mental
account. Whether this is actually the case or not depends, unsurprisingly, on the
reference point for the expenditure. In our model, the risk is new to the individual,
the higher price for the known, safe good constitutes the status quo. Hence, the
formalization in (8) correctly captures this case. One could, however, imagine, that
just as with the risk, some habituation to the lower price of the risky asset takes
place, even if the individual does not purchase it. The reference price regarding the
good would then move from π towards 0, the normalized price of x. This would
result in a perceived (partial) loss when paying the higher price π, moving the
preferences further towards acceptance of the risky good.
5.2 Aggregated risk acceptance decision
If new information becomes available, we have to distinguish between information
that increases V (x, r) (favorable information) and such that decreases V (x, r)
(unfavorable information). Favorable information leads to a downward shift in in-
dividuals’ g∗’s, i.e., the degrees of reference state inclusion at which people are just
indifferent between accepting and avoiding the risk. This shift induces a tendency
of increased risk acceptance, such that in the period when the new information
becomes available, risk acceptance may increase to an extent exceeding the effect
from ”smooth” reference state inclusion. Once this ”jump” is made, however, the
normal risk inclusion process starts again.
Unfavorable information leads to an upward shift in individuals’ g∗s, potentially
resulting in a decrease in aggregated risk acceptance. If people that accepted the
risk before decide to avoid it after the shift, they can induce others to avoid it due
to the decrease in H. Hence, the process of adjustment to the new information
can last several periods. However, once the share of risk acceptance has fully
19Remember from the degree of reference state inclusion in (1) that these are all individuals
for whom the aggregated decisions of other members of the population matter for their reference
state.
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adjusted, the process of increasing risk acceptance restarts, potentially moving
the share back to its former level and beyond.20
Similarly, an increase in the price premium π leads to a tightening of the condition
for risk avoidance, i.e., an upwards shift of g∗, whereas a decrease leads to a
downward shift. The resulting adjustments of the share of individuals accepting
the risk are then just as described above.
Does the process ever stop for H < 1, i.e., before all individuals accept the risk?
Consider the following intuitive explanation for the situation in period t.21 The
process continues as long as last period’s increase in aggregated risk acceptance,
Ht−1 −Ht−2, induces an individual that did not accept the risk in period t− 1 to
accept it in period t. If the share of risk acceptance in the population is stable
in two consecutive periods, Ht = Ht−1, it is stable for all future periods, given
that there are no changes in the parameters. Hence, the self-enforcing process has
ceased.
When would this happen? If one assumes the population to be continuous in the
sense that g∗ is continuously distributed over [0, 1], the process moves smoothly
on to H = 1. If, however, there are gaps in the distribution of g∗, the process
can come to a halt. Assume that individuals are ordered according to the size of
g∗n, where n = 1, .., N indexes the individual, and individual 1 is the one with the
lowest g∗. Then, the process stops if there exists an individual m such that g∗m >
gm(H = m−1N ), i.e., if, given that all individuals of lower order than individual m
accept the risk, she herself still does not accept it. H = m−1N would then define a
stationary state of the process. Changes in the parameters can make the process
leave a stationary state to either a higher or a lower state H. After such changes,
the process reaches a new stationary state with H < 1 only if there exists a gap as
described above such that the state induced by the gap is of higher order (higher
H) than the state that was induced by the parameter change.
Why would such gaps arise? Differences in g∗n can be caused by, e.g., differences in
individuals’ utility and value functions, their reference inclusion-parameters α and
φ, their incomes Y and their reference points rc. A significant gap in people’s g∗ss
could therefore arise if there existed clusters of consumers in the population, like
high income vs. low income, quickly adapting vs. slowly adapting (e.g., technology
prone vs. technology averse), highly reference-dependent preferences vs. slightly
reference-dependent preferences etc. In summary, whenever the characteristics of
individuals are not continuously distributed, gaps in the acceptance levels g∗n may
lead to a stable asymmetric distribution of risk acceptance (0 < H < 1) in spite
of the risk inclusion process.
6 Implications for risk regulation
Two results of our model are particularly relevant for risk regulation. The first
is derived from proposition 1 and condition (15), and was discussed in the last
20Note that for the individuals that accepted the risk before the new information became
available, the degree of reference state inclusion is given by ĝ(h = 1, H) in (1).
21A formal, evolutionary game-theoretic analysis is left for future research.
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section: the process of increased risk acceptance in the population is self-enforcing.
When some individuals accept the risk, this potentially leads to ever more people
accepting it, without any changes in the parameters being necessary. This dynamic
needs to be taken into consideration when regulating the entry of new risks into
the market. Even if acceptance levels are very low at the time of entry and do
not seem to merit much regulatory effort, the value that people assign to the risk
may subsequently increase without that the parameters of the risk improve. But
higher levels of risk acceptance induce a higher amount of risk production. If,
then, the risk is judged to be harmful and to require regulation, adequate policies
may be much harder to implement than prior to the market entry of the risk.
Bratspies (2002) provides anecdotal evidence of this thesis. She reports that for
the regulation of genetically-modified Bt corn in the US, the regulating agency
(EPA) used the argument of expected slow market penetration for the initial lack
of refuge requirements. With such lax regulation being in place in the beginning,
subsequent implementation of tighter rules caused considerable difficulties.
The second result that is relevant for regulation is stated in Proposition 2, namely
that for two identical risks, acceptance levels may differ greatly if one has a higher
degree of reference state inclusion than the other. As noted in section 4.1, this
may be seen as maximizing consumer welfare if the definition of welfare gives equal
weight to the reference-dependent and reference-independent parts of individuals’
utilities. If, instead, v(x, r) is assigned less or even no importance for the determi-
nation of welfare, the risk inclusion effect leads to suboptimal decisions. A related
problem from the risk regulation literature seems to support the latter view. It
has been noted that for many health risks expert and lay opinions differ widely
regarding the severity of these risks. For instance, consumers tend to overrate the
risk induced by hazardous waste sites and underestimate the risk from indoor air
pollution (see, e.g., Portney, 1992; Breyer, 1993; Hoppe and Nowak, 2004). Such
differences often persist irrespectively of information campaigns. The question is
then whose beliefs regulation should be based on. The trend here seems to be
towards following the expert opinion, i.e., following the ”rational” evaluation that
is not biased by media coverage, availability heuristics, feelings of dread etc. (see
Breyer, 1993; Margolis, 1996). If one agrees with this argument, one arrives at
a lower weight for the ”irrational” value v(x, r) than for the ”rational” utilities
up(x) and u(x). As the result, regulatory policies would have to counterbalance
the risk inclusion effect in order to avoid an ”inefficient” increase in risk accep-
tance. In particular, regulation would have to be based on a utility measure other
than people’s stated preferences or WTP measures.
7 Evidence from the field
Finding evidence in support of or against the risk inclusion effect in field data is
not straightforward. In most cases, habituation will work over longer periods of
time, such that influences like new information about the risk or changes in media
coverage are hard to distinguish from the risk inclusion effect. Hence, unambiguous
evidence will be scarce. There are, however, a few instances where habituation
seems to work within shorter time periods, such that other influences are relatively
18
less important.22 Even though such cases do not provide unambiguous evidence
either, they provide some support of our thesis.
One case where risk perception changes seemed to work at accelerated speed re-
gards the risk of developing Creutzfeld-Jakob Syndrome (CJS) after eating beef
that is infected with BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy). BSE had been
known in Europe since the early nineties, but only in March 1996 was it announced
by scientists in the British Parliament that BSE and CJS may be connected. The
reaction of the public was immediate but short-termed in its intensity. Loy (1998)
cites a study by Southey (1996) that found a reduction of beef consumption of
70% from pre-BSE levels in the week after the announcement, but of only 30-50%
one month later. This means that after only 1 month of habituation, half of the
reaction to the BSE-risk announcement had disappeared.
Hadjikhani et al. (1998) conducted two surveys among Swedish consumers, the
first in May 1996 immediately after BSE had become known to the public through
mass media coverage, and the second in August. They found that between the first
and the second survey the share of consumers unwilling to buy British beef had
decreased by 15-20% (from about 80% to about 60%), while the share willing to
buy if it were cheaper increased by 15-25% (from almost 0 to about 20-30%). The
increase in buy-if-it-is-cheaper attitudes during these three months is particularly
illuminating, since it shows that for many individuals the risk is still relevant,
but the WTA measure has decreased from infinity (”unwilling to buy”) to normal
price levels (some share of the price for non-British beef). This is similar to the
behavior observed in the insecticide experiment of Viscusi, Magat, Huber (1987).
It indicates that people have got used to the risk, i.e., they partly included it in
their reference states. The exact causes of this habituation process, e.g., observable
behavior of others, media coverage etc. are, however, hard to infer from this study.
Pennings, Wansink, Meulenberg (2002) cite data on German consumer behavior
which shows a sharp drop in beef sales after the first BSE-infected cow was found
in Germany on November 26, 2000. However, already in mid-January the usual
increase in beef consumption at this time of the year began, and continued to
follow its usual seasonal pattern, albeit at a lower level. This suggests that at
least a share of the population had got used to the risk fairly quickly.
These three examples hint to the fact that after a brief period of extreme con-
sumption reduction, habituation set in pretty quickly and beef consumption rose
again. As said above, this cannot be interpreted as unequivocal evidence of a
risk inclusion effect, since other factors like intensity of media coverage and over-
reactions following frightening press announcements may play a role. The data
are, however, supportive of our model.
Some more support is provided by a survey on the attitudes towards genetically
modified food among US consumers. In general, attitudes towards gm-food in the
US have been influenced by too many different factors (mainly new information
and changes in the attitudes expressed in the mass media) such as to attribute
trends over the last 15 years to habituation. However, the Pew Initiative on
22Habituation and media coverage must be expected to be closely related for some ”high
publicity” risks (see the study of Hadjikhani et al., 1998). However, to keep the model clear and
tractable we do not consider this link.
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Food and Biotechnology published two surveys in 2001 and 2003 where subjects
were first asked how safe they thought gm-foods were. After giving their answers
they were confronted with the fact that more than half of the products at grocery
stores already included gm-substances. Then they were asked again for their safety
assessment of these products. The results were similar in both surveys: initially,
27% (29%) found them safe, while 25% found them unsafe in 2003 (2001). After
being informed of their widespread use, the share of subjects believing in the
products’ safety increased to 44% (48%) while the sceptics dropped to 20% (21%).
We see two main reasons for the change in risk perception. First, subjects may have
experienced some ad-hoc learning, inferring that if so many people eat gm-food
already (including probably themselves), and no cases of adverse health effects
have been reported, there will probably not be any health effects. However, such
reasoning assumes that people see the health effects of gm-food as occurring in
the short run. Hence, if people do not expect all effects to occur immediately,
learning from others’ or one’s own short-term experience can explain only part
of the observed effect. The second possible reason is that some kind of ad-hoc
habituation took place, where the information about the widespread use of gm-
food immediately changed the status quo of the subjects as to (partly) include
the risk from gm-food consumption (”If so many others accept the risk already,
it must be normal.”). The lower risk perception would then be in line with our
predictions. 23
8 Conclusions
We have proposed a model of the inclusion of risks in people’s reference states that
aims at explaining the observed differences in the evaluation of common vs. new
risks. The model is based on the assumption that the risk acceptance decision
of an individual has an impact on other individuals that observe her decision, in
particular on their getting used to this risk. Accordingly, for individuals whose
preferences are only affected by their own decisions or are not reference-dependent
at all, our model has no explanatory power. In this case, trends of increased risk
acceptance would have to be explained by improved information, increased fa-
miliarity with the outcomes of the risk or other learning effects. Naturally, such
effects will matter for individuals that comply with our assumptions, too. Hence,
habituation works as one of many factors that can change the perception of risks.
However, since experimental and field evidence suggest that the majority of indi-
viduals has indeed reference-dependent social-comparison preferences, habituation
to risks as described in our model can be expected to have a significant influence
on overall risk acceptance levels, especially if strong outside factors like vital new
information are absent.
In a companion paper to this article we will consider the effect of risk inclusion if
one assumes non-linear probability weights, a well established behavioral charac-
23Note that our model does not imply that individuals change their prior distribution over
possible adverse outcomes, as may be suggested by the statement that a risk is ”basically safe”
or ”basically unsafe”. However, such statements are of relative rather than absolute nature, i.e.,
in comparison to other risks that the individual faces. Hence, changes in the prior and changes in
the perception of the risk under a given prior can hardly be distinguished for this survey question.
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teristic that we do not consider here. Besides, future research should analyze the
implications of risk inclusion for monetary risks. If the source of monetary risks
can be shown to be relevant for the evaluation of such risks, the risk inclusion
effect may contribute to the explanation of, e.g., the equity premium puzzle. In
addition, a thorough evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the dynamic habit-
uation process, in particular of the circumstances that lead to an interruption of
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